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We test for changes in price behavior in the longest crude oil price series available (1861-2008). We
find strong evidence for changes in persistence and in volatility of price across three well defined periods.
We argue that historically, the real price of oil has tended to be highly persistent and volatile whenever
rapid industrialization in a major world economy coincided with uncertainty regarding access to supply.
We present a modified commodity storage model that fully incorporates demand, and further can accommodate
both transitory and permanent shocks. We show that the role of storage when demand is subject to
persistent growth shocks is speculative, instead of its classic mitigating role. This result helps to account
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Much has been written on the oil shocks of the 1970￿ s as watershed events
that have transformed the energy market; that, together with the lack of
high frequency data from earlier periods, have led to an almost complete
concentration on the post oil shock period among economists1. However,
much can be learned about oil price behavior from the less recent past. The
crude oil price time series illustrated in Figure 1 goes back to 18612; even a
cursory look reveals stark di⁄erences in the behavior of the series at di⁄erent
periods. First, from 1861 until about 1878, there was a period of extremely
high volatility and generally high prices. Then came a much less volatile
period, approximately between 1878-1972, in which prices were also generally
lower. Finally, from about 1972 onwards, we see a second period of high
volatility accompanied again by higher prices.
Our ￿rst task in this paper is to document these di⁄erences and formally
test for changes in behavior. We run two such tests, for changes in persistence
and for changes in volatility. We ￿nd striking empirical similarities between
the periods 1861-1878 and 1972-2008, in that oil prices were both signi￿cantly
more persistent and signi￿cantly more volatile in these periods, both relative
to the long period that separates them, i.e. 1878-1972. We also estimate
that a further break in oil price volatility, but not in persistence, occurred
around 1934, so that the oil price in the period 1878-1934, while much less
volatile than in 1861-1878, was still signi￿cantly higher than in the period
1934-19723.
1Pindyck (1999) is a notable exception.
2The series is taken from British Petroleum￿ s "Statistical Review of World Energy",
revised annually and available at www.bp.com/statisticalreview. Prices are in 2007 $US
per barrel. The series is comprised of three consecutive price series: US average price in
1861-1944, Arabian Light in 1945-1983, and Brent dated in 1984-2007. The 2008 datapoint
was added to the BP series using oil prices from the U.S. Energy Information Agency and
U.S. GDP de￿ ator data from the BEA.
3All of our tests reject the null of no break with a very high level of con￿dence. However,
the con￿dence intervals around the exact break dates are large enough to suggest caution
in over emphasis on individual historical events. Our emphasis will therefore be on the
1What can explain the concurrence of price persistence and price volatility?
We o⁄er an informal, historical narrative, as well as a formal model. Our
approach in this paper is to look for a unifying framework which is ￿ exible
enough to allow for the very di⁄erent price behavior across periods that we
observe. We ￿nd striking historical similarities between the two end-periods
mentioned, 1861-1878 and 1972-2008, in terms of supply and demand factors
a⁄ecting the market for oil. On the demand side, as we explain in greater
detail in Section 3, both periods were years of intense industrialization in
what was then becoming a major engine of the global economy: the U.S. in
1861-1878, and East Asia in 1972-2008. We see these as periods in which the
demand side was characterized by persistent growth shocks. On the supply
side, meanwhile, both periods featured uncertainty regarding the continued
access of consumer markets to oil. This was due to the monopoly of railroads
on transportation in the former period, and to the monopoly of OPEC on
easily exploitable reserves in the latter period (see Section 3 for details).
Despite the remarkable di⁄erence in the scale of the oil industry between
the two periods, both monopolies had a similar e⁄ect: in periods of rising
demand, they were able to restrict access to additional oil supplies, thereby
causing prices to rise.
We argue in this paper that this con￿ uence of supply and demand fac-
tors can explain why we observe large changes in oil price persistence over
the years: persistent growth shocks to demand, if occurring in periods in
which key players in the market had the ability to restrict access to sup-
plies, were translated to very persistent price behavior. In other words, the
monopolistic industry structure in these periods coincided with uncertainty
regarding demand trends to produce uncertainty regarding price trends. We
show in Section 3 that the change-points between periods that we identify in
our formal testing correspond to dramatic shifts in the structure of the oil
broad characteristics of the periods in question, rather than on the exact date of change
from one period to the next.
2industry. During periods when there were no e⁄ective restrictions on access
to supplies, i.e. the industry structure was no longer monopolistic, even large
and persistent shocks did not cause more persistent price behavior. Rather,
the shocks were accommodated through a relatively quick supply response4.
Historically, this was by far the more prevalent pattern: for the most part
the history of oil has been characterized by relatively easy access to needed
oil. Consequently the market trend was quite stable from 1879 to 1971.
The historical narrative suggests reasons why certain periods would ex-
hibit substantially more oil price persistence than others, but cannot by itself
explain the observed concurrence of high persistence with high volatility. A
theoretical framework for oil should be able to accommodate both phases
of the market, and to explain both the observed persistence and volatility
behavior of oil prices. Our third contribution in this paper is to present a
model which does just that: it is an extension of the canonical commodity
storage model ￿ la Deaton and Laroque (1992, 1996), in which we introduce
growth dynamics to their well-known framework. This results in a model that
can accommodate both I(0) and I(1) stochastic processes, so that periods of
stable and stochastic trends can both be considered. The model can explain
our main empirical ￿ndings: it predicts that in the presence of uncertainty
regarding the trend, rational storage behavior will act to enhance volatility.
In the standard commodity storage framework, where uncertainty is in re-
gard to deviations from trend, but the trend itself is viewed as stable, storage
acts to reduce volatility. This feature of the storage model is in itself novel,
as well as useful in terms of explaining the observed patterns in the data.
We present simulations in which this behavior can increase price volatility
following growth shocks signi￿cantly.
4Examples abound: the shocks to demand imposed by the needs of the two world
wars, or by the postwar reconstruction of Europe, were large, persistent, and open-ended.
However none of these major unheavals a⁄ected the price of oil much. When agents tried
to restrict access to supplies their e⁄orts were futile, as U.S. producers learned in 1918,
when the Federal government threatened to draft their workers if they did not comply
(Yergin [1991], page 179).
3The large literature on commodity price behavior falls broadly into two
major strands, depending on whether the commodity in question is perceived
to be renewable. On the one hand, models of storage have been used mostly
to study renewable commodities such as corn and wheat; see Wright (2001)
for a survey of theory and evidence5. The study of non-renewable com-
modities, a de￿nition which includes oil, has followed an altogether di⁄erent
path, strongly in￿ uenced by the seminal contribution of Hotelling (1931).
Krautkraemer (1998) surveys the theory and evidence. In the current paper
we choose storage as the more useful of the two strands. In this we are mo-
tivated primarily by the empirical evidence, which shows quite clearly that
￿nite availability of oil - a separate issue from that of free access to currently
available supplies - is not of ￿rst order signi￿cance in explaining oil price
behavior. In particular, proven world oil reserves have been increasing in
recent decades, in spite of ever increasing production6. As a result, it may
well be that technological advances in oil exploration and utilization will be
enough to satisfy demand in the foreseeable future. That is the assumption
that we make in this paper.
Our work is also related to the ongoing debate on oil and the macro-
economy (see the two recent surveys by Hamilton [2008] and Kilian [2008a]).
This literature is more interested in identifying the source of shocks to oil
prices than in specifying their type; it also deals exclusively with the post-
1973 period. We argue in this paper that a long-term view is essential to
this debate: shocks to the oil market have had remarkably di⁄erent e⁄ects
on the real price of oil across historical periods, not because of their origin
on the supply or the demand side, but rather because of the ability (or lack
thereof) of key players in the market to restrict access to supplies. This liter-
5A notable exception is the paper by Routledge et al. (2000), who ￿nd that oil prices
exhibit the strong mean reversion associated with storage models, as well as a permanent
factor. However these authors focus only on the very recent past (1992-96), and do not
o⁄er a theoretical justi￿cation for the permanent factor.
6See BP Statistical Review (2008) for proven reserves and production data from 1980.
4ature￿ s focus on recent decades can therefore be misleading: in periods when
the ability to restrict access to supplies was lacking, the oil market showed
remarkable ￿ exibility and relative price stability, even in the face of massive
disturbances.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents our empirical ￿ndings
on oil price behavior over time. Section 3 puts these ￿ndings in the context of
the history of supply and demand for oil. Section 4 introduces the model, and
Section 5 examines the model behavior under both transitory and permanent
shocks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Behavior of the Real Oil Price: Then and
Now
Table 1 presents some simple indicators pertaining to the three periods delin-
eated in the introduction. We see that the di⁄erences in mean price between
the years 1861-1877 and the years 1878-1972, at 50.9 and 17.2 respectively
(both measured in 2007 U.S. dollars), are large and statistically signi￿cant
at the 1% level. Mean price between the years 1973-2008 was 44.3 (in 2007
U.S. dollars), which is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the 1878-1972 mean, but at
the same time statistically indistinguishable from the 1861-1877 mean. The
same pattern holds for di⁄erences in the unconditional standard deviation of
annual prices across these periods: at $25.3, the standard deviation of price
in the period 1861-1877 was signi￿cantly higher than that of the period 1878-
1972 ($5.1), but statistically similar to the standard deviation of price in the
years 1973-2008 ($22.3). Examining rates of change, we see again a similar
pattern: both the mean and the unconditional standard deviation of ab-
solute price changes in the years 1861-1877 (39% and 27.5% respectively) are
signi￿cantly higher than the corresponding measures in the years 1878-1972
(14.2% and 13.7% respectively), whereas the latter are signi￿cantly lower
compared with the mean and standard deviation of absolute price changes
5in the years 1973-2008 (21.5% and 22.7% respectively). Note however that
when comparing the years 1861-1877 and 1973-2008, the mean absolute price
change is signi￿cantly higher in the former, while the unconditional standard
deviation of absolute price change (a common measure of volatility) is quite
similar in the two periods. In sum, Table 1 shows that there is much in com-
mon in terms of the behavior of real oil prices between the periods 1861-1877
and 1973-2008, while both periods are signi￿cantly di⁄erent in most respects
from the intervening period 1878-1972.
Studies of the time series properties of real oil prices have taken one of
the following approaches: ignoring these di⁄erences and analyzing the series
as a whole, or else treating the series as composed of separate series "pasted
together" (in the words of Hamilton (2008)), and proceeding to analyze them
in isolation. In one important category, that of determining whether or not
oil prices exhibit a unit root, these di⁄erent approaches have led to opposite
conclusions. Pindyck (1999), an example of the former approach, ignores the
aforementioned di⁄erences, and judges the entire series to be mean-reverting
to a moving quadratic trend. At the opposite end, Hamilton (2008) notes the
abrupt change in the series, and proceeds to analyze the third period only
(with quarterly data). He accordingly determines that the real price of oil
follows a random walk with no drift7.
In what follows we will treat both the assumption of a pure I(0) process
and the assumption of a pure I(1) process as our null hypotheses, and test
whether the series exhibits a shift from I(0) to I(1) (or vice versa) against both
of these assumptions. In other words, instead of trying to decide whether the
series as a whole or in part exhibits a unit root, we aim to determine whether
it shows clear transitions from a stochastic trend to a deterministic one, and
vice versa. In order to do that, we employ a relatively recent test proposed
by Harvey, Leybourne, and Taylor (2006, HLT henceforth). This test is a
7Studies of higher frequency data from the 1990s (daily, weekly) do ￿nd a mean-
reverting factor as well as a permanent factor. See for example Routledge et al. (2000),
Schwartz and Smith (2000).
6modi￿ed version of a test for change in persistence proposed earlier by Kim
(2000), which itself builds on the unit root testing method of Kwiatkowski et
al. (1992). What makes the HLT test of change in persistence appealing is
that it maintains its properties of consistency and appropriate size both under
the I(0) null and under the I(1) null. This allows us to test for structural
change without taking an a-priori stand regarding the null hypothesis.
Appendix A provides an introduction to the testing method and its ra-
tionale. Table 2 presents the results of the HLT change of persistence test,
using the real oil price series. Since the test is designed to ￿nd a single
change-point, whereas the series exhibits two obvious break candidates, we
conducted the test separately for periods 1 and 2, and for periods 2 and
3. The exact end points shown in the table (1881 and 1965) were chosen
arbitrarily; the qualitative results are robust to small changes in these end
points8. Testing for change in persistence in the years 1861-1965, then, we
￿nd very strong evidence for a signi￿cant change in from a high-persistence,
local to I(1) process, to a low-persistence I(0) process, where the point of
change is estimated to be in 1877. This is shown by the very high values of
the relevant test statistics, MSR, MER, and MXR, which are all signi￿cant
at the 1% level. In the period 1881-2008, we ￿nd strong evidence for a change
in persistence from a low-persistence I (0) process to a high-persistence, lo-
cal to I(1) process, with the point of change estimated at 1972. Again, all
three of the relevant test statistics, MS, ME, and MX, point to the same
conclusion, and all are signi￿cant at the 1% level9. We use simulation re-
8As a ratio-based test, the HLT change in persistence test is designed to reject the null
if a point can be found after which the behavior of the series is statistically di⁄erent than
its behavior before that point. When two such points exist, and moreover the behavior of
the series before the ￿rst point is similar to behavior after the second point, this test will
lose power.
9Note that for our test to reject either null, price persistence on one side of a tentative
break should be statistically di⁄erent from price persistence on the other side of the break,
but need not meet any particular critical value. Because of this, Caner and Kilian￿ s (2001)
criticism of KPSS tests, namely, that they may su⁄er from size distortions and therefore
produce spurious rejections, does not apply to our paper. Moreover, we get extremely
7sults from Kim (2000) to calculate the 95% con￿dence interval around our
change-points. As can be seen from Table 2, these are estimated somewhat
imprecisely, with con￿dence intervals of 8 and 10 years for the ￿rst and sec-
ond change-points respectively10. However the rejection of both the null of a
pure I(0) process and the null of a pure I(1) process is quite clear, implying
that a more nuanced view of the series is in order, a view which takes into
account potential changes in persistence behavior.
Apart from the rate of persistence, another time series aspect of real oil
prices that has attracted much attention in the literature is their volatility.
As already mentioned, volatility (as measured by the standard deviation of
absolute rates of growth) was high before 1878, low from around that time
until the early 1970s, then high again until the end of our sample in 2008.
We therefore conducted a test for multiple breaks in oil price volatility, using
the methods of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). The results are shown in Table
3, and illustrated in Figure 2. We de￿ne volatility as the mean absolute
residual from a regression of oil price growth on its lagged value. The test
identi￿es three potential breakpoints: 1878, 1934, and 1972. All three test
statistics against the null of no break are highly signi￿cant, implying that
the series contains at least one breakpoint. However, in deciding how many
breakpoints there are, the various criteria explored by Bai and Perron do
not agree: their sequential procedure selects only one breakpoint, in 1878,
whereas the Bayesian Information Criterion selects all three11. A look at the
coe¢ cients denoting mean volatility in the di⁄erent periods can explain this
discrepancy. We see that the coe¢ cients of Periods II (1879-1934) and IV
high values for our test statistics, by orders of magnitude bigger than the critical values
given in the papers we rely on. Therefore the likelihood of a Caner-Kilian type spurious
rejection in our data is low.
10Kim (2000) ￿nds in simulations that for change-points that occur at the 25th or the
75th percentile of a given series, his procedure for estimating the change-point location
has a maximum standard deviation of 1.6893 for T=100. We accordingly use this value,
scaled to our sample length, to calculate our 95% CIs.
11The LWZ information criterion also chooses 1878 as the only break; however, this
criterion is known to perform badly when breaks are present (i.e. the alternative is true).
8(1973-2008) are very similar, and both are quite di⁄erent from the coe¢ cient
for Period III (1935-1972). As Bai and Perron recognize (2003, pp. 15-16),
in these cases the sequential procedure can be improved upon: the number
of breaks should be chosen according to the last signi￿cant test statistic,
instead of the usual practice of choosing according to the ￿rst insigni￿cant
test statistic. In the current case, as seen in Table 3, this improved sequential
procedure puts the number of breaks at three, similarly to the BIC. Oil price
volatility then has gone down by about half sometime in the last quarter
of the nineteenth century (with 1878 as our best estimate), then gone down
again by about two thirds around 1934. When it increased again, according
to our estimate in 1972, it regained its level of the early twentieth century,
but did not reach the heights set by oil prices before 1878. Note that 95%
con￿dence intervals for the change-points are quite large; as in the change
in persistence test, our con￿dence in the occurrence of breaks in the series￿
behavior is far stronger than our con￿dence in the exact dates of these breaks.
Nevertheless, these years will be useful as anchors in our historical narrative
in Section 3.
We can sum up our empirical ￿ndings as follows: real oil price from 1861-
1877 (or 1878) was highly persistent and volatile, from 1878-1934 was not
as persistent and less volatile, from 1934-1972 it was still not very persistent
and displayed even lower volatility. Finally, from 1972 on the real price of
oil returned to being highly persistent and volatile, though not as volatile as
in the pre-1878 period. Later on, in Section 4, we present a model of the
oil market that ties together these patterns of price behavior. But ￿rst we
need to put our model in historical context, which is the purpose of the next
section.
93 Industrialization and Market Structure: Tran-
sition Points in Context
In Section 2 we identify three points of transition. In 1877-8 and again in
1972, oil price persistence and volatility both changed, while in 1934 we ￿nd
a change in volatility, but no change in persistence. Of these three points,
only 1934 can be linked to a major oil discovery, that of the East Texas Oil
Field a few years earlier. The other two points of transition, we will argue,
had to do with technological and geographic factors that enabled changes
in market structure. In 1878 began the construction of Tidewater, the ￿rst
long-distance pipeline, which eventually ended railroad monopoly over the
transportation of oil. In 1970 the East Texas Oil Field peaked, ending U.S.
control over excess exploitable reserves, and signalling the rise to prominence
of the OPEC cartel12.
These three points also show striking similarities and di⁄erences from a
demand point of view as well. Of these three points, 1934 is special also in
that it occurs in the midst of a worldwide recession. Both 1877-8 and 1972
were years in which the global economy, and with it demand for oil, were
booming, driven by the large-scale industrialization of the United States and
of East Asia, respectively. Rapid industrialization is by de￿nition a transi-
tional stage, and as such it features growth rates that are on the one hand
unsustainably high and on the other hand quite persistent, since the process
of industrialization often stretches over decades. In other words, periods
of rapid industrialization are characterized by persistent growth shocks to
income.
We will argue that the two observed periods in which oil prices were
12The oil industry was, of course, much bigger in the late 20th century compared to its
size a hundred years earlier; oil is also no longer used mainly for illumination as it did
at ￿rst. It is notable however that prominent features of the industry remain relatively
unchanged: oil was internationally traded from the very beginning, demand for it being
global. Moreover, its e¢ ciency as a source of energy made it indispensable to consumers
from the earliest stages, a feature of the industry that remains crucial to this day.
10both highly persistent and highly volatile occurred because two conditions
were simultaneously met in each of these periods: access to supplies was
restricted and demand was unsustainably high. It is important to note that
U.S. industrialization was far from over when the ￿rst such period ended in
1878, and that post-war industrialization in East Asia was well underway by
1972, our estimate of the beginning of the second period of high persistence
and high volatility. These years were not turning points in oil demand,
rather they signi￿ed major structural changes in the petroleum industry,
in which key players with the ability to restrict access to supplies either
emerged or declined in importance. When only one of the conditions was
met, as for example happened during both World Wars (when demand was
unsustainably high but supply was unrestricted), the market was signi￿cantly
less persistent and less volatile. This necessary con￿ uence of demand and
supply factors has been relatively rare looking back all the way to 1860, but
of course has been the reality in the oil market in recent decades13.
It is worth emphasizing that we do not focus on the source of shocks
to the oil market, nor do we attempt to identify these shocks. In fact, the
model we present in Section 4 shows that growth shocks, whether to oil de-
mand or supply, can generate oil prices that are both persistent and volatile,
while AR(1) shocks, again regardless of origin, cannot. In this our paper
di⁄ers from recent contributions which seek to achieve a better identi￿ca-
tion of the source of shocks to oil prices in the post-1973 period (see Kilian
[2008b, 2008c]). Our main contribution is to show that to account for the
radically di⁄erent behavior of oil prices across all periods, identifying the
source of shocks to the oil market may matter much less than understanding
the structure of the oil industry at the time. Studies focusing on the post-
13We stress supply restrictions rather than reserve depletion since there is no evidence
that "running out of oil" was ever a real danger. Oil security, the danger of not having
access to existing oil, was on the other hand very real. In this regard, "capacity constraints"
must be viewed as mechanisms to restrict supply, since by their nature these constraints
- derricks, strorage tanks - can be loosened in the medium run, whereas the amount of
extractable oil in any given ￿eld cannot be increased beyond a certain point.
111973 experience exclude this type of analysis by virtue of their intentionally
limited scope; empirical results pertaining to this period cannot be extended
to environments in which the oil industry￿ s structure is radically di⁄erent.
In the ￿rst years of the U.S. oil industry, U.S. oil extraction was concen-
trated in a small region in northwestern Pennsylvania. Producers relied ￿rst
on water and horse-wagon transport to get the oil to consumers, but soon
it became clear that the only cost-e⁄ective way was via rail. The railroad
companies were quick to lay down tracks to the area, so that by 1865 the
Oil Regions were well served by three di⁄erent railroads. These ￿rms en-
joyed an oligopolistic position, as both production and re￿ning were highly
competitive. That is exactly the situation that gave rise to Standard Oil:
Rockefeller envisioned a large re￿ning concern that could bargain e⁄ectively
with the railroads; Standard￿ s business advantage was well understood at the
time to consist of the special "rebates" that it was in a position to demand
from the railroads. For illustration purposes, in 1877, the year before Rock-
efeller￿ s succeeded in his plan, the "open fare" for rail transport of crude oil
from the Oil Regions to New York was $1.40 per barrel (Bentley [1979], page
28); this amounted to 58% of the average price of a barrel of crude oil in
that year according to our data. Williamson and Daum (1959, Chap. 17)
estimate the per barrel cost of carriage by rail at no more than $0.40 around
that time, giving us an idea of the margins involved.
In 1878 Standard Oil succeeded in acquiring not only the vast majority
of re￿neries, but also all of the short-distance pipelines that connected the
oil wells to the rail tracks. This gave Standard Oil a very strong bargain-
ing position indeed, which Rockefeller proceeded to turn into large discounts
("rebates") from the railroads14. This was "the plan" all along (Yergin [1991],
Chap. 2), but it was upended quite quickly. In the same year, oil producers
who were trying to break the joint monopoly of transportation and re￿ning
14Standard￿ s business advantage over independent re￿ners as a result of its strong bar-
gaining position is estimated by Bentley (1979) to have been $1.00 per barrel of re￿ned
oil.
12started construction on the world￿ s ￿rst long-distance pipeline, the Tidewa-
ter. It was completed in May of 1879. In the face of this technological break-
through, Rockefeller changed his business plan and proceeded to construct
Standard￿ s own long-distance pipelines, choosing to destroy the railroads￿
monopoly on transportation in order to strengthen Standard￿ s monopoly on
re￿ning. This spelled the end of attempts to increase pro￿tability by restrict-
ing access to oil. Having invested in his own infrastructure, and given the
very low transportation costs it a⁄orded him15, Rockefeller￿ s strategy now
was to sell as much oil as possible: "the company needed markets to match
its huge capacity, which forced it to seek aggressively ￿ the utmost market in
all lands,￿as Rockefeller put it" (Yergin [1991], page 50). Indeed, by the early
1880￿ s, Standard Oil was already in bitter rivalry with exporters of Russian
oil over control of the markets in Europe and Asia.
These events occurred against a backdrop of ever rising demand, both
domestic and foreign. Oil was used for many purposes in the latter half of
the nineteenth century, of which the two most important were illumination
of homes and businesses and lubrication of machinery. The United States
was going through rapid industrialization at the time, eventually overtaking
Britain as the world￿ s leading center of manufacturing. During the period,
the share of world industrial output made in the U.S. rose spectacularly,
from 7.2% in 1860, to 14.7% in 1880, to 23.6% in 1900. In absolute numbers,
U.S. manufacturing production rose by a factor of three in the two decades
between 1860 and 1880, and by a factor of eight between 1860 and 190016.
U.S. population more than doubled from 1860-1900, rising from 31.8 million
to 76.4 million, while GDP per capita rose almost as fast, from $2,445 in 1860
to $4,091 in 1900 (constant 1990 dollars)17. As a result domestic consumption
15Williamson and Daum (1959, p. 458) estimate that per barrel transportation costs
in Standard Oil￿ s own pipelines were between $0.12 - $0.20, less than half the rail cost of
carriage.
16Bairoch (1982) is the source for the U.S. absolute and relative industrial output num-
bers.
17Figures for U.S. population and GDP per capita are from Maddison (2003).
13of illuminating oil rose from 1.6 million barrels (mb) in 1873-75 to 12.7 mb
in 1899, while that of lubricating oil rose even more, from 0.2 mb in 1873-
75 to 2.4 mb in 1899 (Williamson and Daum [1959], pp. 489, 678). Even as
urban communities in the United States and Europe shifted to gas or electric
lighting, kerosene remained in high demand in other parts of the world. By
the turn of the twentieth century, there was increasing demand for gasoline,
from the burgeoning auto industry.
The transition point we identify in 1877-8 was therefore the starting point
of sweeping changes in market structure, brought about in an environment
of rapidly growing demand. Before 1878 the railroads were using their mo-
nopolistic position to limit the supply of crude to the markets in the interest
of rent extraction. After 1878 that power was slipping away from them at a
fast clip; by 1884 Rockefeller￿ s network of long-distance pipelines was essen-
tially complete, and the railroads were sidelined. Moreover, since Standard
Oil owned the vast majority of long-distance pipelines, and with demand
expected to continue unabated, there was no player in the market who had
both the interest and the capability of limiting supplies18. This state of a⁄airs
continued until the early 1930￿ s (see below). With supplies limited, shocks
to demand would be fully incorporated into the price of oil. When supplies
were not limited, both demand and supply shocks would a⁄ect the price.
With the trend of demand growth both before and after 1878 uncertain, we
would expect the price of oil to exhibit more persistence when demand shocks
were the main drivers, relative to when both demand and supply shocks were
driving prices.
With new ￿elds being discovered even as old ￿elds were being depleted,
supply growth was actually quite steady. The discovery of the East Texas
Oil Field changed that: from October 1930 to August 1931 oil production in
18The producers in the Oil Regions were relatively small-scale, and had repeatedly failed
in their attemps to control production. There was one exception: in 1887-8, there was
a willingness to cooperate on the part of Standard Oil, and production reduction was
achieved for a short while.
14East Texas rose from zero to over a million barrels per day (Yergin [1991],
Chap. 13). The East Texas Oil Field was by far the largest reservoir of oil
ever discovered, up to that point in time. Its discovery created an oil glut
of proportions heretofore unknown, causing a slump in price that threatened
the entire industry, and rationalizing Federal regulation. Starting in 1933,
the Roosevelt administration set quotas to the states, speci￿cally designed
to curb production from East Texas. By 1937, the system had solidi￿ed its
control over the non-cooperative producers: "a complete cooperation and co-
ordination... between the Federal Government and the Oil producing states
in this common e⁄ort to conserve this natural resource," as the chairman
of the Texas Railroad Commission put it in a letter to Roosevelt (quoted
by Yergin [1991], pp. 258-9). The result was unprecedented control by the
U.S. government over supplies: since East Texas production was far below
its potential, and given the authority to raise and lower the quota as circum-
stances required, the U.S. government (both Federal and state, in particular
the Texas Railroad Commission) had the power to increase or decrease oil
supply almost at will. Over the decades since, while it still had that power,
the U.S. government would use it to stabilize the market on numerous occa-
sions. It increased production enormously during World War II, as well as
during supply crises involving the Middle East, in 1953 (Iran), 1956 (Suez),
and 1967 (Six-Day War). When the surge of oil was no longer needed, it had
the power to reduce production once more.
U.S. regulation thus acted as an automatic stabilizer: "setting production
to match market demand did establish a level of crude output that could be
marketed at a stable price" (Yergin [1991], page 259). This had the e⁄ect of
reducing the standard deviation of supply and demand shocks, and accords
well with the observed reduction in volatility that we date to 1934, around
the time that this mechanism went into e⁄ect. Quite the opposite from
the railroads￿rent extraction strategy before 1878, U.S. government agencies
aimed to stabilize price by adjusting quantity as needed. The supply of oil,
15far from limited, was in e⁄ect quite ￿ exible.
Our third transition point is 1972, where we ￿nd that oil price persistence
and volatility both increased. In 1970 U.S. oil production reached its peak.
In March 1971 the Texas Railroad Commission, for the ￿rst time since World
War II, allowed production at 100% capacity; the ability of U.S. government
agencies to increase production in times of need was gone (Yergin [1991],
pp. 567-8). Excess capacity existed now only in the Middle East, giving
the rulers of these countries the same kind of monopoly power enjoyed by
the railroads almost a century earlier: the ability to extract large rents from
consumers by limiting production19. The ￿rst to exercise that power was the
new ruler of Libya, Muammar al-Qadda￿, who in August 1970 negotiated,
under threat of nationalization, an increase in prices and pro￿ts. Other
leaders followed suit in demanding price increases, to be followed quickly by
outright nationalization of oil resources in some countries (Algeria, Libya).
In the Gulf, 1972 saw an agreement of "participation" of oil producers, i.e.
the transfer of some ownership rights of the oil resources located on their land
from the international oil companies to the governments. These developments
changed fundamentally the nature of the market: the oil producing countries
were now owners (whole or part) of their reserves, and therefore had the
direct ability to control the supply of oil to the market. In 1973, of course,
OPEC states took advantage of the October 1973 war between Israel and its
neighbors to restrict supplies dramatically.
As in the early years of the oil industry, these events were occurring
in a period of increasing demand. The demand for oil is driven, ￿rst and
foremost, by income. In recent decades, world GDP and global oil production
have moved in lockstep; the International Energy Agency estimates long-run
income elasticity of world oil demand at about 0.5, i.e. each percentage
point increase in world GDP is accompanied by a 0.5% increase in the global
19Smith (2008) surveys the debate on whether OPEC can be shown to have acted
collusively to withhold supplies from the market. His conclusion is that the answer is Yes.
16demand for oil (IEA [2006,2007]). This may in fact be an underestimate:
Gately and Huntington (2002) ￿nd that income elasticity of oil demand in
OECD countries is 0.55, but for non-OECD countries the income elasticity
may be as high as 1. The IEA estimates that in 2001-2005, China￿ s higher-
than-average propensity to consume oil may have raised the global income
elasticity to 0.8 (IEA [2007]).
This time it was East Asia that was industrializing fast: ￿rst Japan, then
Taiwan and South Korea, and ￿nally China. Japan￿ s GDP per capita, for
example, more than tripled in two decades, rising from $3,986 in 1960 to
$13,428 in 1980. Japanese GDP by itself already equaled 37% of U.S. GDP
by 1980 (all comparisons in 1990 international dollars, Maddison [2003]).
China industrialized slightly later, but the pace of its industrialization in
the ￿nal decades of the twentieth century was as rapid as that of the U.S. a
century earlier, if not more: between 1980 and 2000, Chinese industrial pro-
duction rose by a factor of 9; between 1970 and 2000, it grew by a factor of
21. In relative terms, the Chinese share of world industrial output was only
0.7% 1970; it has increased to 6.3% in 200020. The IMF￿ s World Economic
Outlook (2008) projects that Asia￿ s share of global trade and manufacturing
will continue to soar in the coming decades, despite the short term disloca-
tions caused by the current ￿nancial crisis. Overall, the average growth rate
in Asia (excluding Japan) between 1973-2001 was 5.4%, compared with 2.1%
for Western Europe, 3.0% for the United States, and 2.7% for Japan during
the same years (Maddison [2003]). It seems clear that Asia, outside of Japan,
was still very much in the midst of an era of industrialization at the onset of
the present century, with no end in sight. This is similar to the situation of
the U.S. economy about a hundred years earlier.
We see therefore a repeat, on a much broader scale, of important features
from the market environment that prevailed before 1878: a combination of
20Statistics for China are from the World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators data-
base.
17supply limits and ever rising demand21. As in the earlier period, with supply
limited in this fashion, shocks to demand would be fully incorporated into
the price. Since these shocks are very persistent, in an era where the trend in
demand is uncertain, we would expect the price of oil to be more persistent,
relative to a period where these limits on supply are not binding. This
persistence in the price of oil can be reasonably expected to continue as long
as demand shocks are persistent, or until the ability of OPEC to e⁄ectively
limit supplies no longer exists, either due to an independent source of oil, or
to an alternative source of energy.
4 An Extended Commodity Storage Model
Our model is an extension of the classic commodity storage framework.
Chambers and Bailey (1996) and Deaton and Laroque (1996) extend the
model to allow for autoregressive shocks. We extend it further to explicitly
incorporate demand, and to allow for growth shocks22.
4.1 Availability and Storage
Time is discrete, indexed by t. The market for oil consists of consumers,
producers, and risk neutral arbitrageurs. The latter have at their disposal a
costly storage technology which may be used to transfer any positive amount
of oil from period t ￿ 1 to period t. Storage technology is limited by a non-
negativity constraint, i.e. the amount stored at any period cannot drop below
21OECD growth was also high at various points during this time period, a fact that no
doubt has been important in the timing of the ￿rst and second oil shocks (see Barsky and
Kilian [2002, 2004]). However this fact cannot account for the very high price persistence
that we observe in this period.
22Other papers which extend the storage model in various ways include among others
Alquist and Kilian (2008), Ng and Ruge-Murcia (2000), and Routlege et al. (2000). These
papers do not seek to explain the di⁄erent behavior of oil prices across historical periods
as we do here, nor do they incorporate growth shocks explicitly into the framework.
18zero. This implies that intertemporal arbitrage, although potentially prof-
itable, cannot always be achieved. In these cases, where the non-negativity
constraint is binding, the market is "stocked out".
De￿ne oil availability, denoted At, as the amount of oil that can poten-
tially be consumed at time t. In other words, this is the amount of oil that
has already been extracted from the ground, either in period t or at some
point in the past, and has not been consumed before period t. It is given by
At = Xt￿1 + Zt; (1)
where Xt￿1 denotes the stock of oil transferred from period t ￿ 1 to t, and
Zt denotes the amount of oil that is produced at time t. For simplicity,
we assume that no oil is lost due to storage23. Decisions concerning both
variables - how much to store, how much to produce - are assumed to have
been made before period t began. In period t agents must decide how to
divide At between current consumption Qt and future consumption, so that
demand - the sum of current consumption and the amount stored for the
future - must always equal current availability:
At = Qt + Xt: (2)
4.2 Demand for Oil
Let Yt denote a demand parameter, which can be thought of as some known
function of world GDP. Yt therefore represents the income e⁄ect on the de-
mand for oil.
We can then write an inverse demand function for oil as follows:
Pt = P(Qt;Yt); (3)
23Alternatively, we could have speci￿ed storage costs by a given loss percentage, as in
Deaton and Laroque (1996).
19which is decreasing in its ￿rst argument, and increasing in its second. This
inverse demand function constitutes a departure from the canonical model,
where demand for the commodity is a function of price only, e⁄ectively as-
suming no income e⁄ects. This departure is a natural one to make, however,
in the context of oil, where oil consumption and income are very highly cor-
related (see references in Section 3). Indeed, we posit an inverse demand
function in which only the ratio of consumption to income matters, so that
if both variables grow at the same rate, the price of oil will remain constant.
We assume therefore that the inverse demand function (3) is homogeneous
of degree zero:
Pt = P(Qt;Yt) = P(
Qt
Yt
;1) = p(qt); (4)
where lowercase letters denote variables normalized by Yt. We think of the
normalized variables as "e⁄ective" amounts, in the sense that a growing
income leads to higher energy needs, spreading any given amount of oil more
thinly. A rise in Yt would therefore, ceteris paribus, decrease the e⁄ective
amount of oil available for consumption and cause a rise in current price24.
We will use a CES inverse demand function:
Pt = q
￿￿
t = (at ￿ xt)
￿￿; (5)
where ￿ > 1 is the inverse elasticity of demand, and at, xt denote e⁄ective
availability and storage in period t, respectively. It is natural to assume that
the e⁄ective demand for oil is inelastic with respect to price. As equation (5)
makes clear, for a given supply of oil, price is a function of the competing
demands of current and future consumption. If the desire to consume more
in the future grows (driven by expectations of future conditions), more oil
24A disadvantage of using normalized quantities is the di¢ culty in directly calibrating
the model to actual observable quantities. This would be an important issue if we had
the ability to perform such calibration. Unfortunately, quantity data for the oil industry -
production, consumption, stocks - are not readily available for the full period (1861-2008).
Our model is highly stylized as a result.
20is stored rather than consumed today, resulting in a price rise today even
though supply has not changed.
We now turn to the speci￿cation of Yt, the income e⁄ect. We consider
two alternative assumptions regarding the particular stochastic process that
Yt will follow. First, we consider a simple AR(1) process, analogous to the
stochastic process that Deaton and Laroque (1996) consider for supply. In










where "t+1 ￿ N(0;￿2
") is an iid shock, and Y t is trend income, i.e. the level
of income that would prevail at time t in a world without income shocks.
Trend income may be constant, i.e. Y t = Y for all t, or increasing over time
at rate ￿ > 0. The analysis of both cases will be quite similar. We think of
this case as more closely relevant to income shocks in developed economies,
where the economy exhibits business cycles around a stable trend.
Second, we will consider the case where income is subject to growth





￿t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿t + ￿t+1; (8)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) is a persistence parameter and ￿t+1 ￿ N(0;￿2
￿) is an iid
shock. It is also possible here to express the stochastic process in terms of
the ratio between Yt and trend income Yt as in (6). Dividing both sides of







We think of this case as more relevant to income shocks in some developing
countries, in particular quickly industrializing economies such as the U.S.
21in the second half of the nineteenth century or China in the last decades
of the twentieth century. In these economies very high growth rates can
be extremely persistent. In principle the world price should be a⁄ected by
developments in both types of economies, depending on the relative intensity
of oil use. Speci￿cally, a positive income shock in an advanced economy
such as the twentieth century U.S., where the trend is stable, is expected
to disappear over time. In contrast, a positive income shock in an emerging
economy such as the late twentieth century China is perceived to have a
more lasting e⁄ect, as China continues its long march towards becoming a
high income economy.
4.3 Supply of Oil
In the canonical commodity storage model, supply Zt varies according to
some stochastic process  t around a predetermined mean e Zt, and it is this
variability in supply that creates an incentive for inter-temporal smoothing
by the large pool of risk neutral arbitrageurs. As the literature has long
recognized, demand and supply shocks in the canonical model are isomorphic:
one can think of a negative realization of  t as representing an especially cold
winter (demand) or a breakdown in a major pipe (supply). For this reason,
since we model demand explicitly, it would be redundant to model supply
shocks separately. Our choice to model demand and not supply explicitly
has to do, of course, with the argument of Section 3.
However, supply in our model is not constant. Rather, it grows at the
trend income rate ￿. That is,
Zt+1 = e ZY t: (10)
We include trend income Yt in equation (10) to capture the e⁄ects of tech-
nological progress: next period￿ s supply depends on current technology. Our
assumption here is that overall technological progress, which drives global
22GDP growth, applies to the oil extraction and exploration sectors as well.
Accordingly, while the total amount of oil existing in the earth￿ s crust is in-
deed ￿nite, technological progress is key to exploiting an increasing fraction
of it over time. Indeed, oil demand and oil production are tightly linked
in the data (IEA [2007]). Note importantly that our assumption is that oil
supply depends on the technology driving income growth, and not on income
growth itself. Therefore shocks to demand will drive a wedge between supply
and demand, causing a shift in equilibrium price. When these shocks are
lasting, as in the growth shocks case, the changes in equilibrium price will
also be lasting.
4.4 Storage of Oil
The de￿ning characteristic of the canonical model is the availability of storage
technology. Private storage is essentially arbitrage: agents will buy oil and
store it if the expected future price, adjusted for ￿nance and storage costs,
is higher than the current price. As is common in the literature, we assume
free entry into the storage sector as well as risk neutrality, implying that the
actions of arbitrageurs will raise the current price until it is high enough to
render the strategy unpro￿table in expectation. Conversely, if the expected
future price is low relative to the prevailing price, agents will reduce their
stocks, causing current price to drop. Note however that stocks cannot be
negative, limiting the e¢ cacy of inter-temporal smoothing in that case.
The amount being stored Xt and the price of oil Pt are determined to-
gether in equilibrium, given the realization of the exogenous parameter Yt.
When equilibrium at time t is fully optimal, i.e. when the storage non-
negativity constraint isn￿ t binding, the price of oil must obey the following
arbitrage condition:
Pt = ￿Et[Pt+1] ￿ C; (11)
where ￿ = 1=(1 + r) is the discount factor, and r > 0 is the exogenously
23given interest rate. The parameter C > 0 denotes the per barrel cost of
storage25. Equilibrium price Pt must be such that there is no incentive to
increase or decrease Xt.
The inter-temporal price condition (11) does not hold in the case of a
stockout, i.e. the case where Xt = 0 because the storage non-negativity
constraint is binding. In this case arbitrageurs expect the future price of
oil to be su¢ ciently lower than the current price that they would sell any
amount of oil they had, except that they have nothing left to sell; every barrel
of extracted oil is being used for consumption. As a result, current price is
above its unconstrained level:
Pt > ￿Et[Pt+1] ￿ C: (12)
4.5 The Rational Expectations Equilibrium
The canonical commodity storage model is a rational expectations model
with one state variable - availability of oil At - and one choice variables
- storage of oil Xt. A solution of the model - the rational expectations
equilibrium - consists of a storage rule, which speci￿es the level of storage
for every possible value of the state variable. Determination of price and
consumption follows immediately from this rule26. In our extended version
of the model the rule retains its salient characteristics, well known from the
literature (see below). But in the extended version, similarly to the AR(1)
case considered by Chambers and Bailey (1996), storage is also the function
of one (or two) exogenous variables, depending on assumptions regarding the
25The cost of storing a barrel of oil have most likely decreased over time. We ignore this
for simplicity, since accounting for a downward trend in storage cost cannot explain the
observed changes in price persistence or volatility.
26Williams and Wright (1991) show that one can add an intended production rule to
the model, whereby suppliers decide one period in advance, depending on their price
expectations, on their desired production. Our Appendix C shows how this extension can
be included in our model. However adding this second choice variable is computationally
cumbersome and moreover does not add much to the insights of the model.
24income process. Relative income Yt=Y t - how far above or below its mean
is the current level of income - serves as the second state variable of the
model when we assume that incomes follows a stable trend. For the case
where income is subject to growth shocks, we need a third state variable:
the current growth rate of income, denoted by ￿t.
In order to solve the model and arrive at the correct storage rule, we
express all quantity variables in their normalized forms. The model can be
then be summarized by two (or three) transition functions (for the state
variables) and one response equations (for the decision variable). Agents
in the model observe all the state variables every period, and decide on
storage accordingly, taking into consideration expectations regarding the next
period￿ s price.













where equation (13) is derived by normalizing equation (1) by Yt+1 and using
(6). E⁄ective supply zt+1 is arrived at by dividing equation (10) through by
Yt.
For the stochastic trend case, there are three transition functions:








￿t+1 = (1 ￿ ’)￿ + ’￿t + ￿t; (17)
where the transition function (15) is derived by normalizing equation (1) by
Yt+1 and using (7) instead.
25The response equation for both cases is:
(at ￿ xt)
￿￿ = ￿Et[Pt+1] ￿ C: (18)
Note importantly that equation (18), which determines optimal storage,
holds only when the state variables are such that the optimal storage is
non-negative. If the state variables dictate negative storage, this response
condition breaks down and we have simply Pt = a
￿￿
t .
The existence and uniqueness (under certain general conditions) of the
rational expectations equilibrium, as well as its important properties, have
been proven in the literature. In particular, Chambers and Bailey (1996)
prove these properties for the case of auto-correlated supply shocks. How-
ever, commodity storage models generally cannot be solved analytically even
in their most simple form, due to the non-negativity constraint. We there-
fore follow the literature since Gustafson￿ s (1958) original contribution and
proceed to solve the model numerically. This can be done using a variety of
methods27. For computational reasons, we choose to use the spline colloca-
tion method (see Judd [1998], Miranda and Fackler [2002] for a discussion),
details of which are given in Appendix B.
The storage rules in our extended model are identical in form to the
ones that result from the canonical model. The di⁄erence is that in the
extended model these rules hold for the normalized variables instead of the
original quantities. In other words, e⁄ective storage has a relationship with
e⁄ective availability in the extended model, under both sets of assumptions
regarding demand, that is qualitatively similar to the relationship between
actual storage and actual availability in the canonical model.
Figure 3 exhibits the optimal storage rule as well as the corresponding
equilibrium price, both as functions of e⁄ective oil availability at (on the
27Williams and Wright (1991), Chap. 3, survey the numeric methods applied to com-
modity storage models in the literature.
26horizontal axis), with the other state variable(s) held constant28. The ￿gure
is qualitatively similar regardless of our assumption on income￿ s stochastic
process.
Figure 3 Here.
In the ￿gure, points on the curves that correspond to a particular level of
e⁄ective availability represent the rational expectations equilibrium - e⁄ective
storage and the resulting equilibrium price - that would prevail if e⁄ective oil
availability were indeed at that level. As illustrated in the ￿gure, e⁄ective
storage is zero when the e⁄ective amount of oil available is low, then after a
kink at a it rises monotonically29. The marginal propensity to store is always
less than one; that is because a rise in storage must lower the expected future
price, as it raises future availability of oil. The kink in the storage rule occurs
when an additional barrel of stored oil will generate an expected pro￿t of zero:
a
￿￿ = ￿E[z
￿￿] ￿ C; (19)
where z, recall, is normalized production (which is a function of current and
trend income; see below).
Importantly, the kink at a is also seen in the equilibrium price function
p: when oil is relatively abundant, i.e. a > a, the price function is more
elastic. That is because once storage kicks in, a rise in oil availability causes
a less than proportionate rise in the amount available for consumption, since
28Certain assumptions need to be made regarding the model￿ s parameters in order to
solve the model numerically. Demand elasticity ￿1=￿ is set at -0.2. The cost of storage C
is 0.02 per barrel. The discount factor ￿ is set at 0.97. E⁄ective supply capacity e Z is set
at 1.3. The trend income growth rate ￿ is set at 0.02, while the persistence parameter ￿
is set at 0.5. Lastly, the income shock￿ s standard deviation ￿ is set at 0.01.
29See Deaton and Laroque (1992), Theorem 1. When availability is relatively low (oil is
temporarily scarce), agents will sell o⁄ all existing inventories of oil while the equilibrium
price is high, expecting it to fall in the following period. Storage will be therefore zero,
and indeed would have been negative had it been possible - agents would want to hold a
short position.
27there is now competing demand from arbitrageurs who are keen to increase
their stocks. As a result, equilibrium price is less sensitive to changes in
availability when storage is positive relative to a stockout situation where
this competing demand is non-existent.
As shown by Chambers and Bailey (1996), the rational expectations equi-
librium is generally dependent not only on current availability, but also on
the current shock. Figure 4 therefore examines how the storage rule and
the equilibrium price change with current income, given by Yt=Y t, when in-
come is subject to shocks around a deterministic trend. This exercise is
very similar to Chambers and Bailey, with similar results: since shocks ex-
hibit positive auto-correlation, a higher than average income today leads to
a higher expected future income, implying that at any level of e⁄ective avail-
ability, arbitrageurs will raise the optimal amount of storage in expectation
of higher prices next period. This, in turn, leads to a higher equilibrium price
today wherever storage is positive.
Figure 4 Here
When income is subject to growth shocks the model behaves in a very
similar way: when current income is high relative to its trend, or when the
current growth rate is relatively high, we would see the storage rule shifting
up and to the left, with the equilibrium price rising accordingly. Intuitively,
the logic is straightforward: when income is subject to growth shocks rather
than autocorrelated level shocks, it is still the case that a current income
that is high relative to trend predicts relatively high income in the future.
Therefore the storage rule and the equilibrium price should respond in a
similar way. When the current growth rate is relatively high, this implies a
higher-than-average growth rate in the future, given our assumption of au-
tocorrelation in growth rate, transition equation 17. That again leads agents
to expect higher income in the future, which works in the same direction. We
see then that the introduction of growth shocks does not change the char-
28acteristics of equilibrium in the model. It will, however, change its dynamic
behavior, an issue to which we turn next.
5 Dynamic Behavior of Storage and Price in
the Extended Model
We can now examine the dynamic behavior of the model following shocks to
the income process. We ￿rst examine the dynamic behavior of our extended
model under the assumption that shocks to income are AR(1), and show
that our extended model behaves very similarly to the model analyzed and
estimated by Deaton and Laroque (1996). In particular, storage in these
conditions serves its classic purpose, to mitigate shocks: arbitrageurs transfer
stocks from times of plenty to times of want. Therefore storage cannot explain
price volatility. We then proceed to show that the model￿ s dynamic behavior
is quite di⁄erent when we assume that demand is subject to growth shocks.
Storage will act to magnify shocks in the model, thereby increasing price
volatility30.
5.1 AR(1) Shocks to Income
Consider ￿rst a positive and persistent shock to income, when the stochastic
process is AR(1). The shock￿ s e⁄ects on e⁄ective availability, equilibrium
price, e⁄ective production, and e⁄ective storage are depicted in Figure 5.
The ￿gure exhibits the results of the following simulation: we let the system
run for 30 periods, where each period a new value of "t is drawn from the
appropriate distribution. We perform 100,000 repetitions of this simulation,
30Kilian (2008c) argues that oil price movements that cannot be explained by either sup-
ply or industrial demand shocks should be thought of as shocks to precautionary demand.
The endogenous storage response in our model is also separate from the direct e⁄ects of
the shock, however it responds to the expected mean price, rather than to its expected
volatility as is the case with precautionary demand.
29with the ￿gure showing mean values for each period. This produces the
baseline case. We then repeat this exercise with one change, namely that in
period 2 there occurs a three standard deviation positive shock to "t. The
mean results of 100,000 repetitions of this simulation are shown in dashed
lines.
The shock to income results in e⁄ective availability dropping sharply,
leading therefore to an immediate rise in current equilibrium price, as a
￿xed amount of oil must satisfy a larger thirst for it. These twin e⁄ects on
e⁄ective availability and price subside gradually over time, as the income
shock dissipates, and the system returns to its steady state. Oil production
is inelastic in our model, implying that e⁄ective oil supply will drop with the
shock, only to recover slowly as the shock dissipates31.
The shock￿ s e⁄ects on storage are more complex. Arbitrageurs are caught
between two contradictory forces following this type of shock: on the one
hand, the rise in current prices and drop in current e⁄ective availability
dictate a drop in optimal e⁄ective storage according to the storage rule (see
Figure 3). On the other hand, due to the shock￿ s persistence future income
is also expected to be higher than average, implying higher expected future
prices and therefore an increased incentive to store at any level of e⁄ective
availability (see Figure 4). However, the former e⁄ect must dominate the
latter in the case of an AR(1) income process, as future income is expected
to be less than current income, implying that future e⁄ective availability is
expected to be higher than its current value, and accordingly that the future
price is expected to be lower than its current, post-shock level. As a result,
the e⁄ect of a positive shock to income would be to reduce storage until the
system reverts back to its steady state.
31If production were elastic, as in Williams and Wright (1991), producers would respond
to these developments by increasing their planned production in expectation of higher
prices. As seen in the analytically solvable no-storage case (see Appendix), the elasticity
of planned production with respect to current income is less than one, due to the positive
slope of producers￿marginal cost curve. E⁄ective production would respond therefore in
a qualitatively similar way if production were not perfectly inelastic.
30Figure 5 Here.
We see in the system￿ s response to a temporary and persistent demand
shock the underlying reason for the disappointment expressed by Deaton
and Laroque (1996) regarding the storage model￿ s inability to account for
the auto-correlation seen in commodity prices. When shocks are transitory,
i.e. when the system is stationary, storage acts as a countervailing force: in
Figure 5, when the equilibrium price is above its steady state level, storage
is smaller than its own steady state level, in a partial compensation for the
shock. This in itself does contribute to a higher equilibrium price in the
next period, as observed in the data. However, persistence of the shock only
serves to reduce the magnitude of this response, since the connection between
current and future conditions formed by the shock￿ s persistence substitutes in
part for the inter-temporal connection that is due to arbitrage. Therefore an
AR(1) shock does not deliver the added persistence that Deaton and Laroque
(1996) are looking for.
5.2 Growth Shocks to Income
Our extended model allows us, as we have seen, to incorporate growth shocks
into the storage framework. In this case, storage does not act as a counter-
vailing force anymore; indeed, immediately following the shock storage tends
to magnify the shock￿ s e⁄ect on equilibrium price. Figure 6 demonstrates
the e⁄ects of a positive and persistent shock to income growth, in this case a
three standard deviation positive shock to ￿t. As in the AR(1) case, a positive
demand shock lowers e⁄ective availability and raises the equilibrium price.
However, in this case the shock brings about a transition to a new steady
state in which e⁄ective availability is expected to be at a lower level perma-
nently, accompanied by a permanently higher price level, and a permanently
lower e⁄ective production level. Importantly, due to positive auto-correlation
in the stochastic process, this transition is spread over several periods. This
31provides a role for storage. As in the AR(1) case, arbitrageurs are subject to
contradictory forces: the current rise in price induces a corresponding drop
in storage, while the prospect of higher prices in the future induces a storage
increase. However, the crucial di⁄erence between the two cases is that here,
due to the shock￿ s persistence, equilibrium price in the future is expected to
increase relative to the current, post-shock price. As a result, in the sto-
chastic trend case the storage-increasing e⁄ect of future prices is stronger
than the storage-decreasing e⁄ect of the current price. Storage in the tran-
sition period is therefore higher in expectation relative to the expected path
it would follow had the shock not occurred. In the stochastic trend case, the
shock￿ s persistence magni￿es the storage response instead of diluting it as in
the stable trend case32. Note that if growth shocks were iid, there would be
almost no storage response: the price determined by the current period shock
would be expected to persist in the future, so there would be no incentive to
change the amount of optimal storage chosen before agents gained knowledge
of the shock.
Figure 6 Here.
It is revealing to compare our simulated response to the case where stor-
age is not allowed. This is done in Figure 7, where the post-shock expected
paths of the endogenous variables are compared with the paths these vari-
ables would take if storage were not possible. Due to the shock to income
growth, storage spikes sharply upwards, leading to a slightly higher equilib-
rium price relative to the no-storage case. E⁄ective availability in the periods
of transition to the new steady state is high relative to the no-storage case,
since storage remains positive throughout the transition (in expectation of
higher prices in the future). Therefore we see a slower expected convergence
to steady state price relative to the no-storage case.
32The same logic applies to the opposite case, where income growth su⁄ers a negative
shock, but with a caveat. Storage response, in this case a decrease, is stronger the more
persistent the growth shock. However, since storage cannot be non-negative, this e⁄ect is
bounded in the negative growth shock case.
32Figure 7 Here.
We see then that in the presence of growth shocks, a rise in current price
may be associated with an increase in optimal storage, rather than a decrease
as would always be the case in the canonical model. Storage in this case does
not "lean against the wind", as is its customary role; it actually magni￿es
the shock somewhat, by increasing demand exactly when it is already high,
in preparation for even higher demand in the future. This behavior could
act to increase price volatility above and beyond what it would otherwise
be without storage. In fact , when we simulate the model with and without
storage, we ￿nd that price volatility following a growth shock is indeed higher
when storage is present. Figure 8 shows the results of these simulations. As
before, we let the model run for 30 periods, simulating the evolution of prices
and quantities after a positive growth shock to income. We then repeat the
process 100,000 times. Each time the model is run, we regress the growth rate
of price on its lag, and use the absolute value of the residuals as our measure
of volatility (the same measure that we used in testing for di⁄erences in
volatility of real oil price data in Section 2). Figure 8 presents the mean
value of this measure, per period, for the case where storage is allowed, and
for the case where it is constrained at zero. We see that the initial positive
growth shock results in much higher price volatility - roughly double with
the parameters assumed here - when storage is allowed, and that the e⁄ect
lasts for several periods until price volatility converges back to its long run
mean33.
Figure 8 Here.
In our extended commodity storage model with growth shocks, we have
arrived at a result that accords well with our empirical ￿ndings: periods
33Recall that our persistence parameter here is set at ￿ = 0:5. Our qualitative results
stand with higher or lower persistence.
33in which persistent growth shocks are dominant should be periods in which
price exhibits extra volatility, relative to periods in which AR(1) shocks are
more prevalent. In quantitative terms, our simulations show that storage
alone can double, on average, the volatility of prices immediately after a
positive growth shock. This di⁄erence is of a similar order of magnitude to
the di⁄erences in price volatility that we observe in the data. This tells us
that the mechanism which we emphasize in this paper can go a long way
towards accounting for the di⁄erences across periods in the complete time
series of real oil price.
6 Conclusion
We argue in this paper that a long-term view is essential to understanding
the dynamic behavior of oil prices. We show that shocks to the oil market
have had remarkably di⁄erent e⁄ects on the real price of oil across historical
periods, but not because of their origin on the supply or the demand side,
rather because of the ability (or lack thereof) of key players in the market to
restrict access to supplies. In other words, it is the con￿ uence of demand and
supply factors that determines the e⁄ects of shocks to the oil market. With
e⁄ective restrictions on access to excess supplies, growth shocks can generate
oil prices that are both highly persistent and, through an endogenous storage
response, highly volatile. On the other hand, without these restrictions, the
same growth shocks will be quickly accommodated, and will not lead to
increased persistence or volatility. In this regard, it is immaterial whether
the growth shocks originate on the demand or the supply side.
The literature￿ s focus on the extremely persistent and volatile post-1973
period can therefore be misleading: throughout most of the history of oil, the
ability to restrict access to supplies was actually sorely lacking, with the oil
market showing remarkable ￿ exibility and relative price stability as a result.
This held true even in years when oil supply or demand were experiencing
34great upheavals, such as during World War II and the postwar re-building of
Europe. The history of the oil industry shows that shifts in industry structure
can occur quite quickly; the structural breaks in price behavior associated
with these shifts are testimony to their importance.
A Testing for Change in Persistence
What follows is a brief introduction to the method of testing for change in
persistence we apply in the paper, and to the test statistics constructed when
using it. Consider a time series yt, where t = 1;:::;T. Assume the series can
be decomposed into the sum of a deterministic trend, a random walk, and a
stationary error:
yt = ￿t + rt + "t; (20)
where rt is the random walk component:
rt = rt￿1 + ut: (21)
Let the errors ut be iid with mean zero and variance ￿2
u. Then one can test
the null hypothesis of I(0) by positing H0 : ￿2
u = 0 against the alternative
H1 : ￿2
u > 0. The test is constructed as follows: let et denote the residuals



















ei; t = 1;:::;T: (23)
A value of this test statistic that is higher than an appropriate critical value
would imply a rejection of the I(0) null. Kim (2000), later modi￿ed and
35corrected by Kim et al. (2002) and Busetti and Taylor (2004), apply this
method to the question of change in the rate of persistence of a series. With




u = 0; t = 1;:::;￿T
￿2





u > 0; t = 1;:::;￿T
￿2
u = 0; t = ￿T + 1;:::;T
: (25)
The point ￿T at which the change from I(0) to I(1) (under H01) or vice
versa (under H10) is assumed unknown, and is estimated during the testing
procedure. The test is carried out as follows. At each possible change-point
(say, at all points in the range [￿lT;￿uT]), compute two sets of residuals: let
et denote the residuals from a regression of yt , t = 1;:::;￿T on an intercept
and a trend, and let e et denote the residuals from a similar regression for the










Note that by construction the test allows for the possibility of a break in
both intercept and trend at the possible change-point. For all ￿ 2 [￿l;￿u]
de￿ne the following statistic:
K[￿T] =








Had ￿ been known with certainty, this statistic (evaluated at ￿) could be
36used to test the null of a pure I(0) process against the alternative H01. A
high value of the statistic would imply a rejection of the I(0) null. Since in
general the true ￿ is not known, Kim(2000) suggests using three functions
of the sequence of K[￿T] over the range ￿ 2 [￿l;￿u]. The limits ￿l;￿u are





















Busetti and Taylor (2004) show that it is possible to use the reciprocal
of Kt to test the I(0) null against H10. We can de￿ne the functions MSR;
MER, MXR in a similar manner, substituting K
￿1
t for Kt everywhere. A
third set of test statistics can be used to test the null against any change in











Further, HLT show that all nine statistics, in a modi￿ed form, can also
be used to test an I(1) null against H01, H10, or both. The modi￿cation they
propose is meant to counter spurious rejections of the null which may occur
if we ignore the possibility that the true model is indeed I(1), i.e. make sure
that the test statistics have the correct size under both I(0) and I(1). HLT
show that this can be achieved by multiplying the relevant test statistic by
37exp(￿bJ), where b is a constant, and J denotes the Wald statistic for testing
the joint hypothesis that in the following regression:
yt = ￿0 + ￿1t + ￿2t
2 + ::: + ￿9t
9;
the coe¢ cients of all higher order trends (i.e. ￿2;:::;￿9, quadratic trend and
above, in the standard case) are zero. HLT also allow for the test to include
local to unit root behavior as well as true unit root behavior, so that H01can
be thought of as a signi￿cant change in persistence from I(0) to a rate of
persistence that is very close to 1, but not necessarily exactly 1. The same
holds for H10.
A ￿nal step in the testing procedure, taken only if the tests indicate that a
change in persistence has indeed taken place, is to estimate the change-point
￿T. Kim (2000) suggests the formula:
￿(￿) =







where, in the case of rejecting the null in favor of H01, the estimated change-
point is:
￿01 = arg max
t=￿l;:::;￿u
￿(￿);
and in the case of rejecting the null in favor of H10, the estimated change-
point is:
￿10 = arg min
t=￿l;:::;￿u
￿(￿):
B Production when Storage is Impossible
When inter-temporal storage is ruled out by assumption, we can analytically
express intended production as a function of current variables and the para-
meters of the model. This is no longer possible when storage is introduced.
This appendix shows the basis for intuitions given in the main paper.





























in the case of income exhibiting a stochastic trend. From the supply rela-










Plugging this into the expected price expression for the stationary income














and using instead the expected price expression for the case where income is














Note that the elasticity of optimal intended production with respect to
39current income (equal to ￿￿￿=(1+￿￿) in the stable trend case, or ￿￿=(1+￿￿)
in the stochastic trend case) is always less than one. This is the standard
result of general supply and demand analysis, due to our assumption that
marginal cost has a positive slope: producers optimize by increasing produc-
tion in the face of increased demand, but increase it at a lower rate. In other
words, e⁄ective intended production e Zt+1=Yt is always a decreasing function
of current relative income, the ratio of actual income to trend Yt=Y t. The full
numerical solution of the model, with storage allowed, this intuition applies
as well.
It is also worth noting how e⁄ective intended production responds to
current shocks in the no-storage case. A positive shock to the supply level -
a high value of  t - will lower e⁄ective intended production. This is due to
positive auto-correlation, as a higher supply today raises expectations for a
higher supply, and lower prices, tomorrow. This naturally leads to a producer
response of decreasing intended production. The opposite occurs following
a positive shock to demand growth - a high value of ￿t - which will increase
e⁄ective intended production. This is also due to positive auto-correlation,
here in growth rates: higher income growth today leads to expectations of
higher than average income growth in the future, implying higher prices in
the future and therefore an increased incentive to produce.
C Solving the Model
We solve the model numerically using spline collocation. The following sum-
marizes the logic of this method, using as an example the simplest case of
one state variable and one choice variable. More complicated versions of
the model are solved in exactly the same way, adding more conditions as
appropriate.
The collocation method approximates an unknown function (in this case,
the equilibrium price function) by a linear combination of known functions
40of the state variable:




Approximating the price function leads to better results compared with ap-
proximating the storage rule directly, since the former function is relatively
smoother. It is always possible to express the equilibrium price function in
terms of the storage rule and vice versa, as shown above.
The collocation method chooses N points in the state variable￿ s support,
the collocation nodes, and stipulates that the equilibrium condition (11) must
hold exactly at these nodes. This reduces the problem￿ s dimensionality from
in￿nity to N; there are N nonlinear equations, one for each collocation node,
and correspondingly N coe¢ cients bn to be determined. We choose cubic
splines as the known basis functions ￿n(A).
The expectation operator is dealt with by a discretization of the known
distribution of the shock, i.e. by assigning probabilities wk to particular
points on the distribution￿ s support "k, where k = 1;:::;K, such that the
continuous density is approximated by the two vectors ("k;wk). The method
then proceeds to ￿nd the coe¢ cients of the linear approximation by using a
double iteration. First, given an initial guess for the coe¢ cients bn, it ￿nds
the values of the choice variable for which the equilibrium condition holds at
the collocation nodes. The equilibrium condition at node i must then hold
exactly, allowing us to solve for Xi:





wkbn￿n[Xi + e Z(1 + "k)] ￿ C: (36)
It is now possible to use the vector X generated in this way to update
41the coe¢ cients bn by solving the following system of equations:




so that at every node i the approximating function is exactly equal to the
equilibrium price. These updated coe¢ cients are now used again to produce
updated values for the response variable at each of the collocation nodes, and
so on until the coe¢ cients converge.
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46Table 1: Indicators of Oil Price Series
Data are from British Petroleum (see text for details). In parentheses are t-
statistics (for mean comparison) and F-statistics (for variance comparison) for the
indicated null hypotheses of equality across periods. Asterisks indicate signi￿cance
against the alternative hypothesis of a one-sided di⁄erence.
Subsamples Full Sample
1861-1877 1878-1972 1973-2008 1861-2008
H0 : X1 = X2 X2 = X3 X3 = X1
Price (2007 $US)
Mean 50.9 (11.9￿￿￿) 17.2 (11.2￿￿￿) 44.3 (1.0) 27.6
Std. Deviation 25.3 (24.7￿￿￿) 5.1 (19.3￿￿￿) 22.3 (1.3) 20.1
Annual price change (abs.)
Mean 39.0% (5.6￿￿￿) 14.2% (2.2￿￿) 21.5% (2.4￿￿) 18.7%
Std. Deviation 27.5% (4.0￿￿￿) 13.7% (2.8￿￿￿) 22.7% (1.5) 19.5%
47Table 2: Testing for Change in Persistence of Oil Price
Real oil prices are annual averages. The full sample 1861-2008 was split in order
to run the tests, which do not accommodate muliple breaks. Tests are adjusted
following Harvey et al. (2006) so that they are appropriately sized whether H0 :
I(0) or H0 : I(1). Table presents the results of three pairs of test statistics, with
their respective critical values in parentheses. The critical values shown refer to the
sample size and the level of signifcance (marked by asterisks). Statistics marked
by a cross test the alternative hypothesis of a change from I(1) to I(0), while
unmarked statistics test the alternative hypothesis of a change from I(0) to I(1).
Only statistically signi￿cant change-points are listed.
Sample 1861-1955 1881-2008
Change-point (direction) 1877 (I(1) to I(0)) 1972 (I(0) to I(1))
95% CI (1873, 1881) (1967, 1977)
Mean Score Statistics:
MS 0.04 (2.38) 35.60￿￿￿ (4.23)
MSy 125.52￿￿￿ (4.24) 0.48 (2.37)
Mean-Exponential Statistics:
ME 0.02 (1.55) 146.36￿￿￿ (3.43)
MEy 261.75￿￿￿ (3.49) 0.61 (1.53)
Maximum Statistics:
MX 0.23 (6.71) 320.61￿￿￿ (12.54)
MXy 559.82￿￿￿ (12.66) 6.44 (6.73)
48Table 3: Testing for Change in Volatility of Oil Price
Real oil prices are annual averages. Volatility is de￿ned as the absolute value
of the error terms from regressing the growth rate of real oil price on one lag. The
table presents results from a test for multiple breakpoints in oil price volatility,
following Bai and Perron (2003). See text for the sequential procedure used to
select the number of breakpoints.
Estimated breakpoints, con￿dence intervals, and period mean volatilities:
Breakpoint 95% CI Mean Volatility (t-statistic)
Period I 1878 1873-1895 0.381 (9.4)
Period II 1934 1931-1946 0.195 (9.1)
Period III 1972 1949-1973 0.061 (2.3)
Period IV 0.221 (8.2)
The Bai-Perron test statistics:
Test Statistic Value
supFT(1 break vs. no breaks) 22.70￿￿￿
supFT(2 breaks vs. no breaks) 14.61￿￿￿
supFT(3 breaks vs. no breaks) 15.97￿￿￿
Sequential Procedure:
supFT(2 breaks vs. 1 break) 6.39
supFT(3 breaks vs. 2 breaks) 32.07￿￿￿
supFT(4 breaks vs. 3 breaks) 3.30




























Figure 1: The Real Price of Oil 1861−2008
1877: change−point from I(1) to I(0) 



















Figure 2: Real Oil Price Volatility, 1861−2008
Break I: 1878
Break II: 1934
























Figure 3: The Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Storage Rule



















































Figure 4: Effect of Increase in Relative Income on RE Equilibrium                                          
Storage Rule                                                     
 
 




















































Figure 5a: Response of Effective Availability to Positive Income Shock
























Figure 5b: Price Response to Positive Income Shock

























Figure 5c: Effective Storage Response to Positive Income Shock






















































Figure 6a: Response of Effective Availability to Positive Growth Shock























Figure 6b: Price Response to Positive Growth Shock

























Figure 6c: Effective Storage Response to Positive Growth Shock

















































Figure 7a: Response of Effective Availability to Positive Growth Shock
 
 


























Figure 7b: Price Response to Positive Growth Shock

























Figure 7c: Effective Storage Response to Positive Growth Shock

























Figure7d: Effective Production Response to Positive Growth Shock
Storage





















Figure 8: Price Volatility Following a Positive Growth Shock
 
 
Storage Allowed
No Storage